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We are concerned with an inﬁnite dimensional variational inequality which is connected
with the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. We will provide existence
theorems and show, under minimal assumptions on the data, the Lipschitz continuity of
the solution. Moreover a general duality theory is provided overcoming the diﬃculty of
the voidness of the interior of the ordering cone which deﬁnes the cone constraints.
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1. Introduction
The aim of the paper is to study from several points of view the following variational inequality.
Find x∗ ∈K such that
T∫
0
m∑
i=1
〈
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi
+ I˜ i(t), xi(t) − x∗i (t)
〉
dt  0, ∀x ∈ K, (1)
where ∂vi
∂xi
and I˜ i are vector-functions belonging to L2([0, T ],Rn) and
K = {x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn): 0 x(t) x(t) x(t), a.e. in [0, T ]} (2)
(see Sections 2 and 3 for notations and details).
Then we are dealing with an inﬁnite dimensional variational inequality which, as we will show in the next sections,
is connected with the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. This problem due to Cournot in [15], recently,
has been studied in the dynamic case (see [7]). Taking into account of the recent paper [34], we will provide general
existence theorems for (1). Then, using only Lipschitz continuity assumptions on the data, we will prove that the solution
to (1) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the time t ∈ [0, T ] and, to this aim, we have to estimate the variation rate
of projections onto time-dependent constraints set. Further we provide a study of a Lagrange theory applied to (1). To this
regard we remark that the usual constraint qualiﬁcation conditions fail in our case, because the interior of the ordering
cone which deﬁnes the cone constraints is empty. Then we are forced to apply a new inﬁnite dimensional duality theory
(see [20,17,35]) which does not require this kind of assumptions and which is very effective, rather than more famous
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: annamaria.barbagallo@unina.it (A. Barbagallo).0022-247X/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jmaa.2011.04.042
232 A. Barbagallo, R. Di Vincenzo / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 382 (2011) 231–247theories (as the Liusternik, Tikhomirov and Goldstine ones). In such a way we can ﬁnd the dual variables which lead to
a simple description of important features of the solution to (1). We recall that the existence of Lagrange multipliers has
been obtained for other equilibrium problems, as dynamic equilibrium problems (see [22,23,7]) and the dynamic Walrasian
problem (see [26,24]), in [17,18,29,9,25]. Moreover, it is worth remarking that A. Mas-Colell (see [32]) was one of the
ﬁrst who has dealt with the emptiness of the ordering cone in connection with the price equilibrium existence problem.
A. Mas-Colell overcome the problem of the emptiness considering as setting a topological vector lattice for which the
ordering cone is convex, monotone and uniformly proper and proving an existence theorem for such problem. However not
too many examples of such spaces are given.
Now we would like to say some words in order to clarify the presence of the time in variational inequality (1). We can
recall that M.J. Beckmann and J.P. Wallace in [10] were the ﬁrst to point out the convenience to consider the evolution in the
time of the equilibrium conditions. In fact they claim that “the time-dependent formulation of equilibrium problems allows
one to explore the dynamics of adjustment processes in which a delay on time response is operating”. Of course a delay
on time response always happens because the processes have not an inﬁnite speed. The possibility of adjustment processes
can be obtained considering the evolution in the time of the cost function and, as a consequence, of the solution. Moreover,
the adjustment processes of the cost is better speciﬁed considering a memory term which one can assume of the type of
the Volterra operator if, as we made, it is supposed that the behavior of physical and economic models, in a deterministic
framework, is the same. In (1) the inﬂuence of the adjustment processes is given by the function (˜Ii)i=1,...,m , which derives
from the memory term acting in the proﬁt function(
vi
(
t, x(t)
)− t∫
0
n∑
k=1
Iik(t − s)xik ds
)
i=1,2,...,m
(3)
(see Section 3), where I˜ i(t) = (
∫ t
0 Ii j(t − s)ds) j=1,...,n , a.e. in [0, T ], for i = 1, . . . ,m.
It is also worth mentioning that the solutions to (1) are the critical points of an associated projected dynamical system
and, then, there exists a strict connection between evolutionary variational inequalities and projected dynamical systems
(see [12–14,19,28]).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce an evolutionary variational inequality that
expresses some equilibrium problems, in particular, a basic model of an oligopolistic market equilibrium problem when an
evolution in time occurs (see [7]). In Section 3, we study evolutionary variational inequality (1) that expresses the dynamic
oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of delay by a long-term memory. Section 4 is devoted to show some
existence results for solutions to variational inequality (1). In Section 5, a Lipschitz continuity result is showed. In Section 6,
we generalize to our case the Lagrange multipliers theorem proved for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem
in [9]. At last, in Section 7, an example concludes the paper.
2. Dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium
In order to present evolutionary variational inequality (1), ﬁrst of all, we consider a variational inequality without the
memory term (˜Ii)i=1,...,m , namely
T∫
0
m∑
i=1
〈
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi
, xi(t) − x∗i (t)
〉
dt  0, ∀x ∈ K, (4)
where K is given by (2).
Variational inequality (4) expresses some dynamic equilibrium problems in which the equilibrium conditions are assigned
maximizing an operator. In particular, the dynamic oligopolistic market conditions are characterized by (4), where the
functions vi , xi and x∗i , for i = 1, . . . ,m, represent some precise elements of the model.
Let us introduce, for the reader’s convenience, the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. This model consti-
tutes an example of imperfect competition and can be viewed as a prototypical game theoretic problem, operating under
the Nash equilibrium concept of noncooperative behavior.
Let us consider m ﬁrms Pi , i = 1,2, . . . ,m, and n demand markets Q j , j = 1,2, . . . ,n, that are generally spatially sep-
arated. Assume that the homogeneous commodity, produced by the m ﬁrms and consumed at the n markets, is involved
during a period of time [0, T ], T > 0. Let pi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1,2, . . . ,m, denote the nonnegative commodity output pro-
duced by ﬁrm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] and let q j(t), t ∈ [0, T ], j = 1,2, . . . ,n, denote the demand for the commodity at
demand market Q j at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. Let xij(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j = 1,2, . . . ,n, denote the nonnegative com-
modity shipment between the supply market Pi and the demand market Q j at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. We group the production
outputs into a vector-function p : [0, T ] → Rm+ , the demands into a vector-function q : [0, T ] → Rn+ , and the commodity ship-
ments into a matrix-function x : [0, T ] → Rmn+ .
Assuming that we are not in presence of production and demand excesses the following feasibility conditions must hold
for every i and j and a.e. in [0, T ]:
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n∑
j=1
xij(t), (5)
q j(t) =
m∑
i=1
xij(t). (6)
Hence, the quantity produced by a ﬁrm, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal to the sum of the commodity from that ﬁrm
to all the demand markets, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], and the demand at a demand market, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal
to the sum of all the commodity shipments to that demand market, at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. Furthermore, we assume that the
nonnegative commodity shipment between the supply market Pi and the demand market Q j has to satisfy time-dependent
constrains, namely that:
xij(t) xij(t) xij(t), ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j = 1,2, . . . ,n, a.e. in [0, T ], (7)
where x, x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn), with x(t) < x(t), a.e. in [0, T ], are considered known with nonnegative values. In this pa-
per we consider the functional setting of the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rmn). Hence, the set of feasible matrix-functions
x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn) is
K = {x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn): 0 x(t) x(t) x(t), a.e. in [0, T ]}. (8)
This set is convex, closed and bounded in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rmn).
Moreover, we associate with each ﬁrm Pi a production cost f i and we consider the more general situation where the
production cost of the quantity pi of a ﬁrm i may depend upon the entire production pattern and upon the time, namely
we assume that
f i = f i
(
t, p(t)
)
. (9)
In the same way, we allow that the demand price for the commodity at a demand market depends, in general, upon the
entire consumption pattern and the time, namely we assume that
d j = d j
(
t,q(t)
)
, (10)
where we have denoted with p and q the vector-functions given by (5) and (6).
Then, we have the following mappings:
f : [0, T ] × L2([0, T ],Rm+)→ L2([0, T ],Rm+),
d : [0, T ] × L2([0, T ],Rn+)→ L2([0, T ],Rn+).
We denote by ci j , i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j = 1,2, . . . ,n, the transaction cost, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], which includes the trans-
portation cost, associated with trading the commodity between ﬁrm Pi and demand market Q j . We consent the transaction
cost to depend, in general, upon the entire shipment pattern and the time, namely,
ci j = ci j
(
t, x(t)
)
, (11)
hence, we have
c : [0, T ] × L2([0, T ],Rmn+ )→ L2([0, T ],Rnm+ ).
The proﬁt vi(t, x(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1,2, . . . ,m, of ﬁrm Pi , at the time t ∈ [0, T ], is then
vi
(
t, x(t)
)= n∑
j=1
d j
(
t,q(t)
)
xij(t) − f i
(
t, p(t)
)− n∑
j=1
ci j
(
t, x(t)
)
xij(t). (12)
We describe the dynamic oligopolistic market mechanism, in which the m ﬁrms supply the commodity in a noncoop-
erative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own proﬁt at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. We seek to determine a nonnegative
commodity distribution pattern x for which the m ﬁrms will be in a state of equilibrium as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A commodity shipment distribution x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium if and only if, for
each i = 1,2, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ], we have
vi
(
t, x∗(t)
)
 vi
(
t, xi(t), x̂
∗
i (t)
)
, ∀x ∈ K, a.e. in [0, T ], (13)
where we denote by xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xin) and x̂∗i = (x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1, x∗i+1, . . . , x∗m), and we set
vi
(
t, xi(t), x̂
∗
i (t)
)= vi(t, x∗1(t), . . . , x∗i−1(t), xi(t), x∗i+1(t), . . . , x∗m(t)).
234 A. Barbagallo, R. Di Vincenzo / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 382 (2011) 231–247In the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rk), let us recall that
〈〈φ, y〉〉 :=
T∫
0
〈
φ(t), y(t)
〉
dt
is its duality mapping, where φ ∈ (L2([0, T ],Rk))∗ = L2([0, T ],Rk) and y ∈ L2([0, T ],Rk).
Now, let us remind that a continuously differentiable function vi (as for example given by (12)) is called pseudoconcave
with respect to xi , i = 1,2, . . . ,m (see [31]) if the following holds a.e. in [0, T ]:〈
∂vi
∂xi
(t, x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn), xi − yi
〉
 0
⇒ vi(t, x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn) vi(t, x1, . . . , yi, . . . , xn), i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
The equilibrium problem deﬁned by (13) is reformulated as an evolutionary variational inequality (see [7]) as the fol-
lowing result shows:
Theorem 2.1. Let us assume that for each ﬁrm Pi the proﬁt function vi(t, x(t)) is pseudoconcave with respect to the variable xi =
(xi1, xi2, . . . , xin), i = 1,2, . . . ,m, and continuously differentiable, a.e. in [0, T ]. Assume that ∇D v is a Carathèodory function such
that
∃h ∈ L2([0, T ],R): ∥∥∇D v(t,u(t))∥∥ h(t)∥∥u(t)∥∥, ∀u ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn), (14)
where ∇D v(x) =
(
∂vi
∂xi j
)
i=1,...,m
j=1,...,n
. Then x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic Cournot–Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisﬁes the evolutionary varia-
tional inequality〈〈−∇D v(x∗), x− x∗〉〉 0, ∀x ∈ K, (15)
or equivalently (4).
It is important to remark that the evolutionary variational inequality in the integral form (15) is equivalent to a pa-
rameterized evolutionary variational inequality, in order to obtain some numerical methods for the calculus of the dynamic
equilibrium solutions.
Corollary 2.1. Let us assume that all the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 are fulﬁlled, then the evolutionary variational inequality (15) is
equivalent to〈−∇D v(t, x∗(t)), x− x∗(t)〉 0, ∀x ∈ K(t), a.e. in [0, T ], (16)
where
K(t) = {x ∈ Rmn: 0 x(t) x x(t)}.
3. The memory term in dynamic oligopolistic market equilibria
Let us assume that in a deterministic framework the memory of the past equilibria can be expressed by means of the
Volterra operator (see [40]). For instance, this assumption is made to describe the relaxation tensor in viscoelastic contact
models as in [1], or the conductivity of an electrolyte in electrochemical machining as in [27,38,39].
Now, let us consider variational inequality (1) and let us discuss about the physical meaning of the presence of the
memory term (˜Ii)i=1,...,m .
In the previous section, we showed that the dynamic Cournot–Nash equilibrium conditions are expressed by evolutionary
variational inequality (15) (see Theorem 2.1).
Assuming the Volterra suggestion holds, the integral term, in our case, is the next( t∫
0
n∑
k=1
Iik(t − s)xik(s)ds
)
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
where I = (Iik)i=1,2,...,m,k=1,2,...,n is an m × n matrix with nonnegative entries Ii j ∈ L2([0, T ],R). These terms express the
effects of the past equilibria on the subsequent ones. Then the effect of the presence of the integral term is the adjustment
of the operator v(t, x(t)) which becomes (3).
The new formulation of the proﬁt operator ensures that the commodity shipments do not only incur in the current
time operator, but are also subject to the impact of all previous equilibrium solutions. Then, the equilibrium conditions are
required on the full operator
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(
t, x(t)
)= (− ∂
∂xij
(
vi
(
t, x(t)
)− t∫
0
n∑
k=1
Iik(t − s)xik(s)ds
))
j=1,2,...,n
,
for i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
We observe that the entries of the matrix Iik can be regarded as continuous weights acting on solutions and allow us to
represent the history of the past equilibrium patterns and their inﬂuence on the current one. The meaning of the integral
term is then justiﬁed: it expresses, by means of a relaxation over the time interval (0, t), the equilibrium distribution in
which commodity shipments incur at the time t ∈ [0, T ] and, hence, the effect of the previous framework situation on the
present one.
The memory term is also strictly connected with the concept of time shifts and delay patterns. In fact, the integral
term represents the displacement, namely the delay, of the equilibrium solution commodity shipments due to the previous
equilibrium state. Therefore, delay effects are not only regarded as perturbation factors for the constraint set (see [37] in
connection with traﬃc network problems) but can also be interpreted as adjustment factors of operators.
Hence, the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem with a long-term memory has the following variational
formulation:
T∫
0
m∑
i=1
〈
− ∂
∂xi
(
vi
(
t, x∗(t)
)− t∫
0
n∑
k=1
Iik(t − s)x∗ik(s)ds
)
, xi(t) − x∗i (t)
〉
dt  0, ∀x ∈ K. (17)
The previous formulation explicitly takes into account of the contribution of the equilibrium solution from the initial time
to the observation time and includes it in the operator as an adjustment factor.
In the following, we check on the explicit form of the gradient of the long-term memory. To this aim, in virtue of the
linearity of the operator and of well-known theorems we get
∂
∂xij
t∫
0
n∑
k=1
Iik(t − s)xik(s)ds =
t∫
0
Ii j(t − s)ds = I˜ i j(t).
Then the operator F (t, x(t)) is given by the sum of the partial derivatives of the proﬁt function and a function dependent
only on the time, namely:
Fi
(
t, x(t)
)= −∂vi
∂xi
(
t, x(t)
)+ I˜ i(t), i = 1,2, . . . ,m,
where I˜ i = (˜Ii j) j=1,...,n and ∂vi∂x j = (
∂vi
∂xi j
) j=1,...,n , so we set F = (Fi)i=1,...,m and I˜ = (˜Ii)i=1,...,m . Moreover, variational inequal-
ity (17) can be read as (1).
4. Existence and Lipschitz continuity results
In this section, some theorems for the existence and the Lipschitz continuity of solutions to the dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium problem will be established. First of all, we remind some deﬁnitions (see [34]).
Let X be a reﬂexive Banach space and let K be a subset of X and X∗ be the dual space of X .
Deﬁnition 4.1. A mapping A :K → X∗ is lower hemicontinuous along line segments, iff the function ξ → 〈Aξ,u − v〉 is
lower semicontinuous for all u, v ∈ K on line segments [u, v].
Deﬁnition 4.2. A mapping A :K → X∗ is said to be pseudomonotone in the sense of Karamardian (K-pseudomonotone) iff
for all u, v ∈ K
〈Av,u − v〉 0 ⇒ 〈Au,u − v〉 0.
We observe that the constraint set K of problem (1) is nonempty, convex, closed, bounded and, hence, weakly compact.
For this reason, applying Theorem 2.18 in [34], we obtain the next existence results for our problem.
Theorem 4.1. Let −∇D v + I˜ be a K-pseudomonotone map and let −∇D v be lower hemicontinuous along line segments, then varia-
tional inequality (1) admits solutions.
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namely ∀x(t) = y(t), a.e. in [0, T ],〈−∇D v(t, y(t))+ I˜(t), x(t) − y(t)〉 0 ⇒ 〈−∇D v(t, x(t))+ I˜(t), x(t) − y(t)〉> 0.
Moreover, we note that condition (14) ensures the lower hemicontinuity along line segments of −∇D v .
It is worth noting that continuity results have been proved for parameterized variational inequalities (see for instance [6])
and for the dynamic traﬃc equilibrium problem (see [2–5]). Moreover, the continuity of solution to (1) has been obtained
in [8, Theorem 4.11].
Now, we prove a Lipschitz continuity result for the memory term oligopolistic market equilibrium solution. For this
reason, we recall a general result proved in [36] for the solutions to the following parameterized variational inequalities:〈
A
(
t, x∗(t)
)
, x− x∗(t)〉 0, ∀x ∈ K(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (18)
where the constraint set K(t), t ∈ [0, T ], is a closed convex and nonempty subset of Rn , A : [0, T ] ×Rn → Rn is a mapping
and 〈·,·〉 denotes the scalar product in Rn . More precisely, the following result holds (see [36, Theorem 1]):
Theorem 4.2. Let the following assumptions be satisﬁed:
(a) A is strongly monotone, i.e., there exists α > 0 such that, for t ∈ [0, T ],〈
A(t, x1) − A(t, x2), x1 − x2
〉
 α‖x1 − x2‖2, ∀x1, x2 ∈ Rn;
(b) A is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, i.e., there exists β > 0 such that, for t ∈ [0, T ],∥∥A(t, x1) − A(t, x2)∥∥ β‖x1 − x2‖, ∀x1, x2 ∈ Rn;
(c) A is Lipschitz continuous with respect to t, i.e., there exists M > 0 such that, for t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ],∥∥A(t2, x) − A(t1, x)∥∥ M‖x‖|t2 − t1|, ∀x ∈ Rn;
(d) there exists κ  0 such that, for t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ],∥∥PK(t1)(z) − PK(t2)(z)∥∥ κ |t1 − t2|, ∀z ∈ Rn,
where PK(t)(z) = argminx∈K(t)‖z − x‖, t ∈ [0, T ], denotes the projection onto the set K(t).
Then, the unique solution x∗(t), t ∈ [0, T ], to (18) is Lipschitz continuous in [0, T ], t1 = t2 , the following estimate holds:
‖x∗(t2) − x∗(t1)‖2
|t2 − t1|2  γ
(∥∥x∗∥∥2C0([0,T ],Rn) + sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ]
t1 =t2
∥∥∥∥ PK(t2)(z) − PK(t1)(z)t2 − t1
∥∥∥∥2), (19)
where γ = γ (α,β,M, T , L).
For the simplifying notations we set
[PK] = sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ]
t1 =t2
∥∥∥∥ PK(t2)(z) − PK(t1)(z)t2 − t1
∥∥∥∥.
To the aim of applying the previous result to the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem with long-term
memory, it is necessary to estimate the variation rate of projections onto time-dependent constraint set [PK] describing the
problem. It is useful to note that K(t) can be reduced to the case where 0 x(t) x(t)−x(t) = x˜(t), with the transformation
x′(t) = x(t) − x(t).
Proposition 4.1. Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] and let x, x : [0, T ] → Rmn be two Lipschitz continuous functions. Let z be an arbitrary point inRmn.
Then it results∥∥PK(t2)(z) − PK(t1)(z)∥∥ L|t2 − t1|,
where L is a positive constant.
Proof. We start with determining the projections of a point z ∈ Rmn on the sets K(t1), K(t2), t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], t1 = t2. To this
aim, we use the following well-known deﬁnition PK(t)(z) = argminx∈K(t)‖z − x‖.
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K˜(t) = {x ∈ Rmn: 0 xij  x˜i j(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n}.
We observe that we must solve the problem for all z ∈ Rmn
min
x∈K(t1)
∑
i, j
(zi j − xij)2, (20)
by means of the Lagrange method.
The Lagrange function associated with problem (20) is
L(y, λ,μ) =
∑
i, j
(
zi j − x1i j
)2 −∑
i, j
λi j(t1)x
1
i j +
∑
i, j
μi j(t1)
(
x1i j − x˜1i j
)
where λ(t1) ∈ Rmn+ and μ(t1) ∈ Rmn+ . We set λi j(t1) = λ1i j and μi j(t1) = μ1i j .
Then, applying well-known results on Lagrange multipliers (see e.g. [17,20] and [30, Theorem 5.3 and pp. 169–172]), if
x1 denotes the minimal point of problem (20), there exist λ1 ∈ Rmn+ , μ1 ∈ Rmn+ , such that
∂L
∂x1i j
= −2(zi j − x1i j)− λ1i j + μ1i j = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n,
and it follows that
x1i j = zi j +
λ1i j
2
− μ
1
i j
2
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n.
It is worth noting that the following constraints also hold: λ1i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n; x1i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j =
1, . . . ,n; λ1i j x
1
i j = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n; μ1i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n; μ1i j(x1i j − x˜1i j) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n.
Now, projecting the point z on the set K(t2) = {x2 ∈ Rmn: 0  x2i j  x˜i j(t2) = x˜2i j, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n}, we ﬁnd the
solution
x2i j = zi j +
λ2i j
2
− μ
2
i j
2
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n, (21)
where λ2i j = λi j(t2) and μ2i j = μi j(t2) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of the set K(t2). Without
loss of generality, we can suppose that x˜1i j < x˜
2
i j , i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n. Moreover, we remark that: λ2i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . ,n; x2i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n; λ2i j x2i j = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n; μ2i j  0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n;
μ2i j(x
2
i j − x˜2i j) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n.
First we note that 0 x1i j  x2i j . In fact if it was x1i j > x2i j  0 we will get x2i j − x1i j =
μ1i j
2 +
λ2i j
2  0 because μ2i j = 0, since
x˜2i j > x˜
1
i j  x1i j > x2i j , i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n, then x˜2i j > x2i j , i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . ,n, and λ1i j = 0, since x1i j > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . ,n. Then 0 x1i j  x2i j .
Assuming 0 x1i j < x2i j (no problem is present if x1i j = x2i j), we get
0 < x2i j − x1i j = −
λ1i j
2
+ μ
1
i j
2
− μ
2
i j
2
.
Now let us note that it is not possible that x1i j < x˜
1
i j , because in this case it will result μ
1
i j = 0 and we will get x2i j − x1i j < 0,
that is a contradiction. Hence, we have x1i j = x˜1i j and considering directly the difference
x2i j − x1i j = x2i j − x˜1i j  x˜2i j − x˜1i j  Li j|t1 − t2|.
Hence, setting L = maxi, j Li j , we get∥∥P
K˜(t2)
(z) − P
K˜(t1)
(z)
∥∥ L|t2 − t1|.
Applying again the variable transformation we obtain the claim. 
As a consequence, it results
‖PK(t2)(z) − PK(t1)(z)‖
|t2 − t1|  L.
Hence, applying Theorem 4.2, we get the following result.
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(a) −∇D v is strongly monotone (with constant α);
(b) −∇D v is Lipschitz continuous with respect to x (with constant β);
(c) −∇D v is Lipschitz continuous with respect to t (with constant M);
(d) I belongs to L∞([0, T ],Rmn).
Then, the unique memory term oligopolistic market equilibrium solution x∗ is Lipschitz continuous in [0, T ]. Moreover, let t1 = t2 ,
the following estimate holds:
‖x∗(t2) − x∗(t1)‖2
|t2 − t1|2  γ
(∥∥x∗∥∥2C0([0,T ],Rn) + L2), (22)
where γ = γ (α,β,M, T , L).
We recall that the boundness assumption on the matrix-function I implies that the matrix-function I˜ is Lipschitz con-
tinuous with respect to t , and the sum of two Lipschitz continuous functions with respect to t is Lipschitz continuous with
respect to t .
5. Lagrange theory
This section is devoted to show some Lagrange duality results for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem
with long-term memory. First of all, we remind some deﬁnitions and results about the inﬁnite dimensional duality theory
(see [20,17,35]).
Let X denote a real normed space and X∗ the topological dual of all continuous linear functionals on X , and let C be a
subset of X . Given an element x ∈ X , the set:
TC (x) =
{
h ∈ X: h = lim
n→∞λn(xn − x), λn ∈ R, λn > 0, ∀n ∈ N, xn ∈ C, ∀n ∈ N, limn→∞ xn = x
}
is called the tangent cone to C at x. Of course, if TC (x) = ∅, then x ∈ ClC . If C is convex, we have (see [30]):
TC (x) = ClCone
(
C − {x})
where
Cone(C) = {λx: x ∈ C, λ ∈ R, λ 0}.
Following Borwein and Lewis (see [11]), we give the following deﬁnition of quasi-relative interior for a convex set.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let C be a convex subset of X . The quasi-relative interior of C , denoted by qriC , is the set of those x ∈ C for
which TC (x) is a linear subspace of X .
If we deﬁne the normal cone to C at x as the set:
NC (x) =
{
ξ ∈ X∗: 〈ξ, y − x〉 0, ∀y ∈ X},
the following result holds:
Proposition 5.1. Let C be a convex subset of X and x ∈ C. Then x ∈ C belongs to the quasi-relative interior of C , in short, x ∈ qriC, if
and only if NC (x) is a linear subspace of X .
By using the notion of qriC , in [20], the following separation theorem is shown.
Theorem 5.1. Let C be a convex subset of X and x0 ∈ C \ qriC. Then, there exists ξ = θX∗ such that
〈ξ, x〉 〈ξ, x0〉, ∀x ∈ C .
Vice versa, let us suppose that there exists ξ = θX∗ and a point x0 ∈ X such that 〈ξ, x〉  〈ξ, x0〉, ∀x ∈ C, and that Cl(TC (x0) −
TC (x0)) = X. Then x0 /∈ qriC.
At last, we recall the deﬁnition of convex-likeness.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let S be a nonempty subspace of a linear real space X and let Y be a linear real space partially ordered by
the cone C . A mapping g : S → Y is called convex-like if the set g(S) + C is convex.
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ordered by a convex cone C . Let f : S → R and g : S → Y be two functions such that the function ( f , g) is convex-like with
respect to the cone R+ × C of R× Y .
Let us consider the problem
min
x∈K f (x) (23)
where
K = {x ∈ S: g(x) ∈ −C}
and the dual problem:
max
u∈C∗ infx∈S
{
f (x) + 〈u, g(x)〉}, (24)
where
C∗ = {u ∈ Y ∗: 〈u, y〉 0, ∀y ∈ C}
is the dual cone of C .
We will say that Assumption S is fulﬁlled at a point x0 ∈ K if
TM˜(0, θY ) ∩
(]−∞,0[ × {θY })= ∅, (25)
where
M˜ = {( f (x) − f (x0) + α, g(x) + y): x ∈ S \K, α  0, y ∈ C}.
Then the following theorem holds (see [35]):
Theorem 5.2. Let us assume that the function ( f , g) : S → R × Y is convex-like. Then if problem (23) is solvable and Assumption S
is fulﬁlled at the optimal solution x0 ∈ S, also problem (24) is solvable, the optimal values of both problems are equal and it results〈
u, g(x0)
〉= 0
where u is the optimal point of problem (24).
Taking into account Theorem 5.2 it is possible to characterize a solution of the constraint optimization problem (23) as
a saddle point of the following Lagrange functional (see [35])
L(x,u) = f (x) + 〈u, g(x)〉. (26)
Theorem 5.3. Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 5.2 are fulﬁlled. Then x0 ∈ K is a minimal solution to problem (23) if and only
if there exists u ∈ C∗ such that (x0,u) is a saddle point of Lagrange functional (26), namely
L(x0,u) L(x0,u) L(x,u), ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ C∗,
and, moreover, it results that〈
u, g(x0)
〉= 0.
In the following, we want to apply the above duality theory to our problem.
Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to variational inequality (1) and let us set
ψ(x) = 〈〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉〉, ∀x ∈ K
where F (x∗) = −∇D v(x∗) + I˜ and let us observe that
ψ(x) 0, ∀x ∈ K
and
min
x∈K ψ(x) = ψ
(
x∗
)= 0. (27)
We associate to variational inequality (1) the following Lagrange functional:
L(x,α,β) = ψ(x) + 〈〈α, x− x〉〉 + 〈〈β, x− x〉〉,
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C∗ = {(α,β) ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn)× L2([0, T ],Rmn): α(t) 0, a.e. in [0, T ], β(t) 0, a.e. in [0, T ]}
is the dual cone of the ordering cone C of L2([0, T ],Rmn) × L2([0, T ],Rmn); of course in our case C = C∗ and the functions
ψ(x), g1(t) = x(t)− x(t), g2(t) = x(t)− x(t) are linear. Let us show that ψ(x), x ∈ K, veriﬁes Assumption S. By using the same
technique of the proof of Lemma 4.7 in [9], we obtain the following preliminary result:
Lemma 5.1. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to variational inequality (1) and let us set, for i = 1,2, . . . ,m and j = 1,2, . . . ,n,
Ei j− =
{
t ∈ [0, T ]: x∗i j(t) = xij(t)
}
, Eij0 =
{
t ∈ [0, T ]: xij(t) < x∗i j(t) < xij(t)
}
,
Eij+ =
{
t ∈ [0, T ]: x∗i j(t) = xij(t)
}
.
Then it follows
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0 a.e. in Eij−,
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) = 0 a.e. in Eij0 ,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0 a.e. in Eij+.
Proof. Let us remark that it results
〈〈−∇D v(t, x∗(t))+ I˜(t), x(t) − x∗(t)〉〉= − T∫
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt
= −
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij0
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt  0.
Assuming that xlr(t) = x∗lr(t) for l = i and r = j, we get ∀xij  xij  xij , for i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . ,n,〈〈−∇D v(t, x∗(t))+ I˜(t), x(t) − x∗(t)〉〉= −∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
−
∫
Eij0
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt
−
∫
Eij+
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt  0. (28)
Let us choose
xij
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 xij in Eij−,
= x∗i j in Eij0 ,
= xij in Eij+,
then, from (28) it follows
−
∫
Eij
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt  0. (29)−
A. Barbagallo, R. Di Vincenzo / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 382 (2011) 231–247 241Since xij(t) − xij(t)  0, a.e. in Eij− , we obtain that ∂vi(t,x
∗(t))
∂xi j
− I˜(t)  0, a.e. in Eij− . In fact if there exists a subset F of Eij−
with m(F ) > 0 such that − ∂vi (t,x∗(t))
∂xi j
+ I˜ i j(t) < 0 in F choosing
xij
{= xij in Eij− \ F ,
> xij in F ,
it results
−
∫
F
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt < 0,
that contradicts (29).
Then,
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0 in Eij−.
Analogously we get
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) = 0 in Eij0 .
In (28), we choose
xij
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
= xij in Eij−,
= x∗i j in Eij0 ,
 xij in Eij+,
then it results
−
∫
Eij+
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt  0.
Since xij(t) − xij(t) 0, a.e. in Eij+ , then ∂vi(t,x
∗(t))
∂xi j
− I˜ i j(t) 0, a.e. in Eij+ . In fact, if there exists F ⊆ Eij+ with m(F ) > 0 such
that ∂vi(t,x
∗(t))
∂xi j
− I˜ i j(t) < 0 in F , choosing
xij
{
= xij in Eij+ \ F ,
< xij in F ,
we have
−
∫
F
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xij(t) − xij(t)
)
dt < 0.
Hence
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0 in Eij+,
and the proof is complete. 
Now we can prove the following result:
Theorem 5.4. Problem (27) veriﬁes Assumption S at the minimal point x∗ ∈ K.
Proof. First of all, we remind that
TM˜(0, θL2([0,T ],Rmn), θL2([0,T ],Rmn))
=
{
y: y = lim
n→+∞λn
[(
ψ(xn) − ψ
(
x∗
)+ αn,−xn + x+ yn, x− xn + zn)− (0, θL2([0,T ],Rmn), θL2([0,T ],Rmn))],
with λn > 0, 0 = lim
n→+∞
(
ψ(xn) − ψ(x) + αn
)
, θL2([0,T ],Rmn) = limn→+∞(x− xn + yn),
θL2([0,T ],Rmn) = lim (xn − x+ zn), xn ∈ L2
([0, T ],Rmn) \K, αn  0, yn ∈ C}.n→+∞
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l 0. We have
l = lim
n→+∞λn
{
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
T∫
0
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt + αn
}
 lim
n→+∞λn
{
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij0
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt −
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
}
,
lim
n→+∞λn
(
xni j − xij − ynij
)= θL2([0,T ],R), i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j = 1,2, . . . ,n,
lim
n→+∞λn
(
xij − xni j − zni j
)= θL2([0,T ],R), i = 1,2, . . . ,m, j = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Furthermore, being
lim
n→+∞λn
(
xni j − xij − ynij
)= θL2([0,T ],R), ynij  θL2([0,T ],R), λn > 0,
and in Eij− having
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0,
we get
lim
n→+∞λn
{
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
}
= lim
n→+∞λn
{
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
−
∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − xij(t) − ynij(t)
)
dt
−
∫
Eij−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
]
ynij(t)dt
)}
 0.
Moreover, we have
lim
n→+∞λn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Ei0
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt = 0.
Since, it results
lim
n→+∞λn
(
xni j + zni j − xij
)= θL2([0,T ],R), λn > 0, zni j  θL2([0,T ],R),
and in Eij+ it holds
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) 0,
we get
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n→+∞λn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
= lim
n→+∞λn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
](
xni j(t) + zni j(t) − xij(t) − zni j(t)
)
dt
= lim
n→+∞
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
−
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
]
λn
(
xni j(t) + zni j(t) − xij(t)
)
dt
+ lim
n→+∞λn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫
Eij+
[
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t)
]
zni j(t)dt  0.
Then the claim is achieved. 
The previous result allows us to prove the existence of Lagrange multipliers that describe the oligopolistic market equi-
librium conditions.
Theorem 5.5. x∗ ∈ K is a solution to variational problem (1) if and only if there exist α∗, β∗, γ ∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn) such that:
(i) α∗(t) 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗(t) 0, a.e. in [0, T ];
(ii) α∗(t)(x(t) − x∗(t)) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗(t)(x∗(t) − x(t)) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ];
(iii) −∇D v(t, x∗(t)) + I˜(t) = γ ∗(t), a.e. in [0, T ], where γ ∗(t) = α∗(t) − β∗(t), a.e. in [0, T ].
Proof. Taking into account of Theorem 5.3 there exists (α∗, β∗) ∈ C∗ such that (x∗,α∗, β∗) is a saddle point of the Lagrange
functional:
L(x∗,α,β) L(x∗,α∗, β∗) L(x,α∗, β∗), ∀(α,β) ∈ C∗, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn), (30)
and moreover〈〈
α∗, x− x∗〉〉= 0, (31)〈〈
β∗, x∗ − x〉〉= 0. (32)
Since α,β  θL2([0,T ],Rmn) , x− x∗, x∗ − x θL2([0,T ],Rmn) , in virtue of (31) and (32) we obtain
α∗(t)
(
x(t) − x∗(t))= 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗(t)
(
x∗(t) − x(t))= 0, a.e. in [0, T ].
From (30) we have, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn),
L(x,α∗, β∗)= 〈〈−∇D v(x∗)+ I˜, x− x∗〉〉+ 〈〈α∗, x− x〉〉+ 〈〈β∗, x− x〉〉 0 = L(x∗,α∗, β∗);
taking into account (31) and (32), we get〈〈−∇D v(x∗)+ I˜ − α∗ + β∗, x− x∗〉〉 0, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn).
Assuming
x1 = x∗ + ε, x2 = x∗ − ε, ∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn),
it results, ∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn),
L(x1,α∗, β∗)= 〈〈−∇D v(x∗)+ I˜ − α∗ + β∗, ε〉〉 0, (33)
L(x2,α∗, β∗)= −〈〈−∇D v(x∗)+ I˜ − α∗ + β∗, ε〉〉 0. (34)
Then, making use of (33) and (34), it follows, ∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn):〈〈−∇D v(x∗)+ I˜ − α∗ + β∗, ε〉〉= 0,
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namely, it results
−∇D v
(
t, x∗(t)
)+ I˜(t) − α∗(t) + β∗(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ]. (35)
Hence, setting γ ∗(t) = α∗(t) − β∗(t), a.e. in [0, T ], we obtain (iii).
Vice versa, if there exists x∗ ∈ K, α∗, β∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn) that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), (iii), we get that (x∗,α∗, β∗) is
a saddle point of the Lagrange functional L. Then, from Theorem 5.3, we obtain that x∗ is a solution to (1). 
5.1. Interpretation of Lagrange multipliers
We point out the meaning of the Lagrange multipliers. With analogous procedures as in [9], we can obtain that
α∗i j(t)
(
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)= 0, ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,m, ∀ j = 1,2, . . . ,n, a.e. in [0, T ],
β∗i j(t)
(
x∗i j(t) − xij(t)
)= 0, ∀i = 1,2, . . . ,m, ∀ j = 1,2, . . . ,n, a.e. in [0, T ].
From (ii) we get that when α∗i j(t) > 0, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], the commodity shipment between the supply market Pi and
the demand market Q j , at the time t ∈ [0, T ], is minimum. Then, when α∗i j(t) > 0, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], we have a “bad”
signal because there is a minimal trade.
Vice versa, when β∗i j(t) > 0, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], the commodity shipment between the supply market Pi and the
demand market Q j , at the time t ∈ [0, T ], is maximum and we have a “good” signal for the economy.
Moreover, when α∗i j(t) is positive, a.e. in [0, T ], we get β∗i j(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ], and from (iii) we derive
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i(t) = −α∗i j(t), a.e. in [0, T ],
namely we are in presence of a decrement of the proﬁt.
On the contrary, if β∗i j(t) > 0, a.e. in [0, T ], it results
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) = β∗i j(t), a.e. in [0, T ],
namely, there is an increasing trade.
Moreover, we obtain the usual result when xij(t) < x∗i j < xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ], and α∗i j(t) = 0 and β∗i j(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ],
namely
∂vi(t, x∗(t))
∂xij
− I˜ i j(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ].
6. Numerical example
Let us now consider an example consisting of three ﬁrms and four demand markets, as in Fig. 1. The feasible set is
K = {x ∈ L2([0,1],R3×4): 0 x11(t) t, 0 x12(t) t, 0 x13(t) 2t, t  x14(t) 5t,
0 x21(t) 2t, t  x22(t) 2t, 0 x23(t) t, 0 x24(t) t,
0 x31(t) 2t, t  x32(t) 4t, 0 x33(t) 3t, 0 x34(t) 2t, a.e. in [0,1]
}
.
We consider the proﬁt function v : [0,1] × L2([0,1],R3×4) → L2([0,1],R3) deﬁned by
v1
(
t, x(t)
)= −3x211(t) − 52 x212(t) − 2x213(t) − x214 − 2x11(t)x12(t) + 5tx11(t) + 2tx12(t) + 4tx13(t) + 6tx14(t),
v2
(
t, x(t)
)= −2x221(t) − 3x222(t) − 4x223(t) − 3x224(t) − x22(t)x31(t) − 2x24(t)x33(t)
+ 4tx21(t) + 7tx22(t) + 3tx23(t) + 3tx24(t),
v3
(
t, x(t)
)= −2x231(t) − x232(t) − 4x233(t) − x234(t) − x22(t)x31(t) − 2x24(t)x33(t)
+ 4tx31(t) + 4tx32(t) + 2tx33(t) + 3tx34(t).
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∇D v
(
t, x(t)
)
=
(−6x11(t) − 2x12(t) + 5t −2x11(t) − 5x12(t) + 2t −4x13(t) + 4t −2x14(t) + 6t
−4x21(t) + 4t −6x22(t) − x31(t) + 7t −8x23(t) + 3t −6x24(t) − 2x33(t) + 3t
−x22(t) − 4x31(t) + 4t −2x32(t) + 4t −2x24(t) − 8x33(t) + 3t −2x34(t) + 3t
)
.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution is the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:
1∫
0
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt  0, ∀x ∈ K. (36)
Now, we verify that −∇D v is a strongly monotone operator, in fact〈−∇D v(t, x(t))+ ∇D v(t, y(t)), x(t) − y(t)〉
= [6(x11(t) − y11(t))+ 2(x12(t) − y12(t))](x11(t) − y11(t))
+ [2(x11(t) − y11(t))+ 5(x12(t) − y12(t))](x12(t) − y12(t))+ 4(x13(t) − y13(t))2 + 2(x14(t) − y14(t))2
+ 4(x21(t) − y21(t))2 + [6(x22(t) − y22(t))+ (x31(t) − y31(t))](x22(t) − y22(t))
+ 8(x23(t) − y23(t))2 + [6(x24(t) − y24(t))+ 2(x33(t) − y33(t))](x24(t) − y24(t))
+ [(x22(t) − y22(t))+ 4(x31(t) − y31(t))](x31(t) − y31(t))+ 2(x32(t) − y32(t))2
+ [2(x24(t) − y24(t))+ 8(x33(t) − y33(t))](x33(t) − y33(t))+ 2(x34(t) − y34(t))2
 2‖x− y‖23×4.
Taking into account of the direct method (see [33,21,16]), we consider the following system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
6x∗11(t) + 2x∗12(t) − 5t = 0,
2x∗11(t) + 5x∗12(t) − 2t = 0,
4x∗13(t) − 4t = 0,
2x∗14(t) − 6t = 0,
4x∗21(t) − 4t = 0,
6x∗22(t) + x∗31(t) − 7t = 0,
8x∗23(t) − 3t = 0,
6x∗24(t) + 2x∗33(t) − 3t = 0,
x∗22(t) + 4x∗31(t) − 4t = 0,
2x∗32(t) − 4t = 0,
2x∗24(t) + 8x∗33(t) − 3t = 0,
2x∗34(t) − 3t = 0,
x∗ ∈ K.
We get the following Lipschitz continuity solution, a.e. in [0,1],
x∗(t) =
⎛⎜⎝
21
26 t
t
13 t 3t
t 2423 t
3
8 t
9
22 t
17
23 t 2t
3
11 t
3
2 t
⎞⎟⎠ ,
that belongs to the constraint set K, hence it is the equilibrium solution.
Now, we suppose to insert a long-term memory to the proﬁt operator v in order to study the numerical equilibrium
solution affected by past equilibria by means of a matrix-function I belonging to L∞([0, T ],Rmn). Moreover we assume, a.e.
in [0,1],
0 I˜11(t)
21
5
t, 0 I˜12(t)
t
3
, 0 I˜13(t) 4t, 0 I˜14(t) 4t,
0 I˜21(t) 4t, 0 I˜22(t)
t
4
, 0 I˜23(t) 3t, 0 I˜24(t)
9
4
t,
0 I˜31(t)
17
t, 0 I˜32(t) 2t, 0 I˜33(t) 2t, 0 I˜34(t) 3t,
6
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F
(
t, x(t)
)
= −∇D v
(
t, x(t)
)+ I˜(t)
=
(
6x11(t) + 2x12(t) − 5t + I˜11(t) 2x11(t) + 5x12(t) − 2t + I˜12(t) 4x13(t) − 4t + I˜13(t) 2x14(t) − 6t + I˜14(t)
4x21(t) − 4t + I˜21(t) 6x22(t) + x31(t) − 7t + I˜22(t) 8x23(t) − 3t + I˜23(t) 6x24(t) + 2x33(t) − 3t + I˜24(t)
x22(t) + 4x31(t) − 4t + I˜31(t) 2x32(t) − 4t + I˜32(t) 2x24(t) + 8x33(t) − 3t + I˜33(t) 2x34(t) − 3t + I˜34(t)
)
.
Hence, the memory term oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution is the solution to the evolutionary variational in-
equality:
1∫
0
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ I˜ i j(t)
)(
xij(t) − x∗i j(t)
)
dt  0, ∀x ∈ K. (37)
We obtain the memory term solution by means of the direct method (see [21,16,33]), a.e. in [0,1],
x(t) =
⎛⎜⎝
21t−5˜I11(t)+2˜I12(t)
26
t+˜I11(t)−3˜I12(t)
13
4t−˜I13(t)
4
6t−˜I14(t)
2
4t−˜I21(t)
4
24t−4˜I22(t)+˜I31(t)
23
3t−˜I23(t)
8
9t−4˜I24(t)+˜I33(t)
22
17t+˜I22(t)−6˜I31(t)
23
4t−˜I32(t)
2
6t−3˜I33(t)+˜I24(t)
22
3t−˜I34(t)
2
⎞⎟⎠ ,
that is Lipschitz continuity for the previous assumptions.
It is interesting to consider the impact of the past equilibria on the solution of the problem with long-term memory. The
memory term commodity shipments can decrease or increase with respect to the ones without memory term and these
changes are important because they express the adjustments of the market due to the inﬂuence of the past equilibrium
solutions.
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